I recently concluded reading the book titled:
Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War.
It is a succinct summary of Pakistan and it’s activities including it’s obsession with India. Written from a western perspective, it is particularly interesting as it eschews the wars before 1998 and starts with Kandahar hijacking. It has details of myths created by Pakistan around its various misadventures. A must read for any one interested in the subject. An excerpts about effect of ending of cold was and disintegration of USSR:
“While India had become more pragmatic and outward-looking, Pakistan had become more ideological and isolated. Pakistan had misread the collapse of the Soviet Union as having been caused by the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and evidence of the benefits of Islamist proxies. Unable to see beyond its immediate neighbourhood, it disregarded the many other causes of the collapse—the Soviet Union had been rotting from within for decades for reasons quite independent of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s backing for the Taliban and Pakistan-based groups fighting in Kashmir through the 1990s had also deepened its well of support for Islamist militancy. It increasingly presented itself as a champion of Muslims worldwide, defining the defence of everyone from Kashmiris to Palestinians as a matter of national interest. Saddam Hussein, whose 1990 invasion of Kuwait had been defeated by a US-led coalition, was seen as a hero.”
Another excerpt about recent surgical strikes by India on terrorist camp inside POK:
“Shortly before calling the media to the news conference, the foreign ministry circulated—via the same WhatsApp group—a White House statement on an overnight phone call between Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his US counterpart Susan Rice. Condemning the Uri attack as “cross-border terrorism”; the Americans reiterated US demands that Pakistan take action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and reaffirmed “the robust US-India partnership”. It was one of the strongest official statements in favour of India ever from Washington, which for years had tried to balance pressure on Pakistan over its support for Islamist militants with quiet diplomacy to nudge Delhi on Kashmir. Notably it made no mention of Kashmir; nor called for India and Pakistan dialogue. The entire onus was on Pakistan to disarm its jihadi proxies. The US statement set India up well for the announcement at the media briefing, where the main speaker was, unusually, the Indian Army’s Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO). In an overnight operation, Lt-General Ranbir Singh said, the Indian Army had conducted “surgical strikes” against Pakistan-backed militants preparing to infiltrate into Indian Kashmir. These strikes on launch-pads along the LoC had inflicted “significant casualties”. India had no plans for further military operations, he added, and had already contacted the Pakistan Army to inform it formally of its action. The DGMO read his statement in English and Hindi, took no questions and saluted the media on his way out. Other military officials were on hand to tell journalists the Indian Army had crossed the LoC in several different places to target would-be infiltrators. For the first time since 1971, India had announced military action across the LoC.”
Generally concluding Para is a mystery in a fiction but in a non-fiction; it can entice interest. One may read the book as to how the author, namely Myra Macdonald, reached to following conclusion: Continue reading →