Aaron Swartz’s Prosecution in violation of International Law and Equity

Death of a crusader!

English: Aaron Swartz at a Creative Commons event.

English: Aaron Swartz at a Creative Commons event. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Aaron Swartz was a champion of the cause of free information. More so the freedom from intermediaries. First about his recent cause. JSTOR is a website which holds more than 1,400 journal titles in more than 50 disciplines from about 800 Universities, in a digital format. The authors of these articles get nothing from sharing their content but the JSTOR pays to the Publishers for participating the content in its database. BTW JSTOR also charges a fee for accessing its content.
Aaron was bulk downloading the contents via Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s  data network. JSTOR discovered and caught hold of Aaron. The matter was settled and Aaron returned the downloaded content to JSTOR. After the civil dispute between the affected parties was over, FBI arrested Aaron alleging wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer and claiming to be acting under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act {18 U.S.C. § 1030}. The question is:

Was prosecution of Aaron, even if legal, justified in overall circumstances? or was it a persecution to deter him from being a crusader of free information cause? Continue reading

Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions

Mens rea, Motive or Intent.

Citation. 1 All E.R. 41 (H.L. 1974).

Brief Fact Summary: Defendant was convicted of murder for deliberately setting fire to a house which resulted in the death of two occupants. Defendant argues he lacked the requisite intent for murder.

Ratio: The fact that Defendant was not certain who, if anyone, was present in the house was irrelevant when he undertook actions that could cause grievous bodily harm.

Explanation: Defendant’s actions had to rise to a level where grievous bodily harm would endanger life. The Court found that to redefine the statute was the legislature’s responsibility and not the courts. However, based on the common law in place and statutory scheme, the court ruled that the Defendant’s conviction would stand

Facts: The Defendant set fire to a house by pouring about half a gallon of gasoline through a letter box of the house and lighting it on fire. Four people were asleep in the house. Two made it out, two young girls died in the fire. The jury was instructed that the intent to do grievous bodily harm was sufficient to convict for murder. The Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder. The Defendant appealed, arguing that he did not foresee the deaths of the individuals and the crime of murder required an intent to endanger an individual’s life, not just an intent to do grievous bodily harm.

Held: Malice aforethought is defined as an intent to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, a person, whether such person is actually killed or not.

If for example, an individual set a bomb to go off at a certain time in a public street, he intends to injure someone. The fact that he was not certain that anyone would be around at the time the bomb went off is irrelevant, the fact is that he intended to cause some sort of injury which is sufficient.

In the case at bar, it was apparent to the court that setting fire to a dwelling during the early morning when individual were likely to be present was sufficient to demonstrate an intent to do grievous bodily harm.